Al-Qaeda's third in command played central role in relations with Taliban

Analysis by Camille Tawil in London
For Al-Shorfa.com
2010-06-03

[AFP/Getty Images] Al-Qaeda sought to mend ties with the Taliban by appointing al-Yazid as commander.

With the death of its commander-general in Afghanistan, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, al-Qaeda lost a major figure whose importance does not lie in its military role, but rather in its ability to weave strong ties with the Afghan and Pakistani tribes.

Maintaining ties with regional tribes is crucial because they are likely providing protection for al-Qaeda leaders who live in regions along the Afghan-Pakistani border.

Abu al-Yazid, known as Sheikh Saeed al-Masri, 55, was mourned by al-Qaeda a few days ago, alongside other members of his family (three daughters, a granddaughter and other individuals). He was killed reportedly during a raid in late May which targeted a village near Miranshah, the largest city in the tribal area of North Waziristan in Pakistan, a suspected hideout of many Arab leaders of Al-Qaeda.

Despite being a founding member of al-Qaeda in the late 1980s, al-Masri's role was initially of an administrative nature. His full name was Mustafa Ahmad Muhammad Uthman Abu al-Yazid, from the Governorate of Sharqia in Egypt. He graduated from Zaqaziq University.

He worked as an accountant for Osama Bin Laden and was in charge of accounting for his company Al-Aqiq which he ran from Sudan where bin Laden resided between 1992 and 1996. He moved with the al-Qaeda leader to Afghanistan after the Sudanese asked him to leave in 1996.

In Afghanistan, al-Masri continued accounting work for bin Laden. However, the money that he was asked to distribute was not being spent only on running the business operations of the company, as was the case in Sudan. It started to be funneled to the funding of operations carried out by al-Qaeda internationally.

Al-Masri was identified in the September 11th attacks Commission Report as al-Qaeda's chief financial officer. According to media reports, he wired money from a Dubai bank account to the al-Qaeda cell that carried out the September 11th hijacking of airplanes in New York and Washington. US investigations indicate he opposed execution of the September 11th attacks, like many other members of the Shura Council of al-Qaeda who were opposed to the Islamic legality of bin Laden's decision to launch attacks against the United States, apparently because it was executed without consulting the Taliban.

Some opponents within al-Qaeda's ranks argued that bin Laden pledged allegiance to the leader of Taliban, Mullah Omar, "to hear and obey", and subsequently he should not have carried out something of the order of the September 11th attacks without first consulting him on the matter.

Abu al-Yazid left Afghanistan for Pakistan once US forces began the war on terror in October 2001 and overthrew the Taliban regime in Afghanistan within a few weeks. A number of al-Qaeda leaders were killed or captured as part of the war on terror, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Intelligences agencies were able to hunt down a number of individuals linked with bin Laden’s organization.

As time went by, it became apparent that al-Qaeda, whose movements were restricted to a narrow geographic area in the tribal areas in Pakistan and southeastern Afghanistan, was suffering from attrition and was gradually losing its field commanders who were experienced in tactical operations.

Some of these "fighters" were killed in airstrikes such as the Egyptian Abu Khabab the "poison expert" in Al-Qaeda, and the Libyan Abul Laith Al-Qasimi, who announced in 2007 that a group within the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group had joined al-Qaeda. Some were arrested in intelligence operations such as Abul Faraj Al-Libi in Pakistan and Abdul Hadi Al-Iraqi or died of natural causes such as Abu Obeida Al-Masri, who died in 2007 from hepatitis.

When Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi, the military commander of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and one of the senior Arab fighters there left, it led to the promotion of Abu al-Yazid in his new position.

Al-Iraqi left Afghanistan and went to Iraq to mend relations with the branch of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and the other factions of the resistance. But he was arrested before he could reach Iraq during an intelligence operation whose details have not yet been fully disclosed.

The announcement in May 2007 that Abu al-Yazid would assume the position that was previously occupied by al-Iraqi, shocked many of al-Masri’s acquaintances, since they knew that he did not possess any fighting experience. Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi fought alongside the Afghans against the Soviets since the 1980s and was known as one of the main military leaders of al-Qaeda.

Some explained that the move to appoint a financial manager who was described as a company accountant to that important military position showed that al-Qaeda was really suffering from attrition at the leadership level. New, younger recruits were not experienced enough to take leadership positions.

However, it is highly likely that by appointing of Abu al-Yazid as its leader in Afghanistan and Pakistan, al-Qaeda was not thinking about the military role that he or his fighters would have under his command.

The number of those fighters was low. Most of fighting operations are carried out by Afghan fighters who belong to the Taliban – especially its branch in southeastern Afghanistan known as the Haqqani Network – or to the Hezb-i Islami ("Islamic Party") led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

For that, the leadership of al-Qaeda probably did not intend for Abul Yazid Al-Masri to take a military role. Instead, it was apparently hoping to make use of his strong ties with the Pashtun tribes under whose protection al-Qaeda elements have taken cover, especially on the Pakistani side of the border.

Al-Masri built up contacts once he settled in Afghanistan, specifically in Kandahar, the capital of southern Afghanistan. He lived in the region as if he were an ordinary Afghan citizen. This stood in contrast to some Arabs who would set themselves apart from the Afghans, preferring to live only in Kabul's upper-class neighborhoods.

The appointment of Abu al-Yazid as the leader of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan probably sought to appease the anger of some Taliban leaders who disapproved of what Osama Bin Laden did on September 11th, 2001, an action which some considered led to the Taliban’s downfall in Kabul and the death of thousands of Afghans in the fighting that continues to this day.

It was remarkable that Abu al-Yazid appeared in a propaganda videos distributed by al-Qaeda that showed him in a meeting with leaders of the tribal fighters of the Taliban, an indication that there was strong cooperation between the two sides.

There is no doubt that relations between al-Qaeda and the Taliban branch affiliated with the Haqqani Network based in north Waziristan (where Abul Yazid was killed) are strong. However, al-Qaeda's relations with the Taliban branch led by Mullah Omar (the Quetta Shura) are not as clear. This could possibly be due to geographical differences. The branch of the Quetta Shura is active in the southern provinces of Afghanistan (especially Kandahar, Helmand and Oruzgan), whereas the Haqqani network is active in the southeast (such as the provinces of Baktia, Paktika, Nangarhar and Kunar). But other observers believe there could be other reasons related to some Taliban leaders' unwillingness to forget that the actions of al-Qaeda are what contributed to their current situation.

Bookmarking

Please comment on this article so that we can improve the experience of viewing this website.